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Auto-Owne rs Ins urance Co. v. Harrington:
Resisting the Impulse to J udicially Rewrite
Exclusion Cla uses
I. INTROD UCTION
Individuals pur cha s e lia bility insur ance for one primar y
purpose: to shift lia bility to an ins urer for injur ies they may
caus e.1 In order to protect themselves from liability for intentional inj ur ies , ins ur a nce compa nie s ty pica ll y s ta te i n th e policy
agreement tha t cover a ge does not ex ten d to “bodily in jur y . . .
which is exp ecte d or in ten ded by the in s ur ed . . . .”2 A policy
with such an exclusion claus e clearly does not cover injur ies
wrongfully caus ed by the intentional torts of an in sur ed
person.3 Over the past few deca des, however, a more difficult
iss ue h a s arisen: whether such a clause also excludes from cove ra ge injuries ca used by an insur ed person’s intentional acts
tak en in s elf-defense.4
This Note exa mines a ca s e tha t w re s tl es wi th this is s ue. In
Auto-Owne rs Ins uranc e Co . v. Harr ingto n, deci ded J ul y 29,
1997, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that, according to
the pla in la ngu a ge of the exclusion claus e at i ss ue, injuries
caus ed by intentional s elf-defensive a cts, even if lega lly justifiable, ar e excluded from covera ge; thus , an insu rer ha s no duty
to defend or i ndemnify a n ins ured under s uch circumsta nces. 5
Part II of this Note provides general background on how var ious sta te courts v iew the iss ue. Part III briefly outlines the

1. S ee Gra nge In s. Co. v . Br oss ea u, 776 P. 2d 123, 124 (W as h. 1989); se e also
B r ya n P. Wh ita ke r, Empty Hands, Deep Pockets : Tort L iabilit y a nd P ote ntial fo r
Recovery Against Individuals Applying Martial Arts Training in S elf-Defense , 31 GONZ.
L. RE V . 413, 415 (19 96). For a dis cuss ion of an ins urer ’s duty t o defend or indemni fy
a n insured when a claim is ma de, see infra note 80 and accompanying text.
2. North Carolina Farm Bu re au Mut. Ins . Co. v. S tox, 412 S .E.2d 318, 321
(N.C. 1992 ).
3. S ee infra note 93 a nd a ccompa nyi ng te xt; se e also Whita ke r, s upra note 1,
a t 416 (“Participating in an as sault . . . is considered an intentional act . . . and
would th er ef ore f a ll out s id e t he s cope of cov er a ge.”).
4. S ee generally Whi ta ke r, s upra note 1 (providing overview of issues r elevant
to cov er a ge de te rmi na ti ons in ma rti a l a rts s el f-d ef en s e s it ua ti ons ).
5. 565 N.W .2d 839, 840 (M ic h. 1997 ).
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facts in the Harring ton case a nd the court’s holding. Pa r t IV
ana lyzes the cour t’s r ea s oning i n de ta il , a s well as the reas oning of other courts on both si des of the iss ue. Thi s Note concludes that the Michigan court’s “freedom of contra ct” reas oning is s ound; further, it offers a dditional support for the view
that injuries cause d by intentional a cts tak en in self-defense
are indeed “intended or expected” from the stan dpoint of the
insu red, and a re thus properly excluded from covera ge.
II. B ACKGROUND
In holdin g tha t in jur ies ca us ed by i nte nti onal a cts t a k en in
self-defense ar e excluded from covera ge under a n “expe cted or
intended injury ” claus e, the Michigan S upreme Court joined
what the Florida S upreme Court called “the majority of jur is dicti ons.”6 While these courts recognize a legal right of individuals
to defe nd th ems elv es , the y gen er a ll y p oint t o “the s a nctity of
the parties to freely contra ct”7 a nd f in d th a t t he la ngu a ge of the
exclusion cla us e a t is s ue u na mbigu ousl y p re clud es cover a ge.8
“Other jur is dictions ,” however , “do not fin d this mech a nica l
interpretation appr opria te”;9 these juris dictions find that the
la ngu a ge of such exclusion clauses is a mbiguous a nd justify
their holdings with va rious public policy arguments. 10
The law on whether intentional a cts t a k en in self-defense
are pr operl y e xcl ude d fr om lia bilit y cove ra ge is , however, still
in a s ta te of fl ux. Ma ny s ta te cou r ts ha ve yet to address the
iss ue, and at lea st one sta te supreme court has ch ang ed its
mind as to how these claus es s hould be interpret ed.11 Therefore, a lth ough thi s Note s peci fica ll y exa mines the decision of
the Michigan S upreme Court, it has broad application; it is
simply a ma tter of time before other sta te courts a re forced to
exam ine (or reex ami ne) this is sue.

6. State Farm F ire & Ca s . Co. v . Ma rs ha ll , 554 S o. 2d 504, 505 (F la . 1989).
Whether thi s t ru ly i s a ma jorit y r ule is some wha t dis pute d. S ee infra note 44.
7. Marsh all, 554 So. 2d a t 505.
8. S ee infra Section IV.A.
9. State Fa rm Fi re & Cas . Co. v. Pooma ih ea la ni , 667 F. S up p. 7 05, 7 08 (D.
Haw. 1987 ).
10. S ee infra S ect ion I V.C.
11. S ee Transa merica Ins. Group v. Meere, 694 P.2d 181, 190 (Ariz. 1984)
(Holoh a n, C.J., di ssenti ng ) (“Th[is] issue . . . was decided in Loc kh art v. Allstate Ins.
Co. , 119 A riz . 150, 579 P .2d 1120 (Ap p. 1978 ). Re vie w w a s de ni ed by th is cou rt. ”).
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III. AU T O -OWNE RS INS URANCE CO . V . HA RR IN G T O N 12
A. Facts
J a m es Ha rrington (Har rington), defendant in this declara tory re li ef a ction, w a s the holder of a l ia bili ty ins ur a nce p olicy
iss ued by the plai ntiff, Auto-Owners Insura nce Company (AutoOw ne rs ).13 Under the te rm s of thi s p olicy, Aut o-Owners ha d a
duty to pay dama ges res ulting from “covered” bodily injuries to
third pa rt ie s ca us ed by the ins ured a nd to defend the insur ed in
civil actions a ris ing out of such injuries .14 The policy specifically
excluded fr om such cover a ge a ny “bodily in jur y . . . exp ec ted or
intended” by the ins ur ed.15
Dur ing the a ft er noon of Augus t 1, 1989, Bria n Tew (Tew),
who w a s living with Harri ngton’s neighbor, became intoxicated
and aggressive toward members of Harrington’s family.16 Tew’s
behavior became more erra tic as the evening progressed; he
threa tened to kill Harri ngton’s nephew and wa s la ter obser ved
firing a n automatic weapon into a near by lak e.17 In response to
these threa ts, Harr ington prepared himself to protect his family by ret rievi ng a s hotgun from his gara ge.18
Later that night, Har rington’s wife observed Tew climbing
up the side of the garage towar d an upsta irs w indow where the
Ha rrington childr en w ere located. 19 As su min g Tew st ill ha d a
wea p on and pla nned to har m the fa mily, Harr ington intentionally shot Tew with the shotgun, hitting him in the stomach.20

12. 565 N.W .2d 839 (M ic h. 1997 ).
13. S ee id.
14. S ee id. at 841. The “Per sona l Lia bilit y” section of the policy s ta ted:
We will pay all sums which an insured person becomes legally obligated
to pay as damag es bec aus e of b odily injury . . . co vered by this pol icy.
If a claim is mad e o r s uit is bro ugh t agains t th e insured person for
liability under this cove rage, we will de fend the insure d pers on at our
expens e . . . .
Id.
15. Id.
16. S ee id. at 840.
17. S ee id.
18. S ee id.
19. S ee id.
20. S ee id. at 842. Ha r r in gt on a dmitted in deposition testimony that he
“intentionally pointed his gun at Tew and intended to shoot him, hoping to stop Tew’s
adv an ce towa rd t he bed room wi ndow.” Id.
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Tew died as res ult of the shooting. Although Tew had no
wea pon in his possess ion at the time of the shooting, criminal
charges were not brought agains t Har rington.21
Tew’s family brought s u it agains t Har rington and AutoOwners for w rongfu l de a th . Auto-Owners filed this action
seeking a declara tion that i t ha d no duty to defen d or
indemnify.22 The insura nce compa ny ar gued that because the
plai ntiff admittedly intended to shoot Tew, the injury was
“expected or inte nded” within the meaning of the exclusion
claus e, and thus outsi de the covera ge of the policy.23 Har rington
countered that beca use hi s a ctions w ere ta ken in s elf-defense,
Auto-Owners s hould be required to defend him. He argued that
his actions, while volitional, were not “‘wrongful’ or
‘unjus ti fie d,’” and therefore could not result in a n “intentiona l”
injury.24
The tria l court found that Auto-Owners owed Har rington a
duty to defend. The Michigan Court of Appeals rev erse d,
holding that Harrington’s a dmittedly intentional a ct fell
“squarely within the intentional-act exclu s ion.”25 The Mi chi ga n
Supr eme Court agreed, stating that “[t]o except injurious action
tak en in self-defense from the intentional-acts exclusion would
impermissibly disr egard the clea r la nguage of the . . . contr a ct
between in s ur er a nd i ns ur ed.”26 The court further held that
where injuries are “intentional, or at least expected,” they are
“excluded from indemnificati on covera ge, even if tak en in s elfdefe ns e.”27
B . Th e Court’s Reas oning
The Michigan Supreme Court based its decision that
injuries caused by an intentional act taken by an ins ured in

21. S ee id. at 840.
22. S ee id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 842.
25. Id. at 840. For the Michigan Court of Appeals, the question of whether
Tew’s inju rie s w ere “inte nded or ex pected” hinged s imply on w he th er Ha r r in gt on “w a s
capable of foreseeing the consequences” of his a ctions . Auto-Owner s In s. Co. v.
Harrington, 538 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Mich. Ct. A pp. 1995), aff ’d, 565 N.W.2d 839 (Mich.
1997 ). Thus wher e the inju ry is “su bjectiv ely . . . inten ded an d expe cted,” the fa ct
t ha t the insured has acted in “self-defense [does] not create a n exception to the
i nt en ti on a l act s e xclu si on . . . .” Id. at 110.
26. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 842.
27. Id. at 842S 43.
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self-defense fall within a n “intende d or expected” exclusion
clause primar ily on a s trict a nalys is of what it called the “plain
la ngu a ge of the policy excl us ion.”28 The court initially noted
tha t “[a]n insur ance policy is a n agreemen t between par ties
that a court i nte rp re ts ‘much the s a me a s a ny other contra ct’”;
as with other contracts, the aim is to “best effectuate the intent
of the pa rt ies .”29 Thus, although a coverage exclusion clause is
“to be s tr ict ly const ru ed i n fa vor of t he i ns ur ed,”30 s uch a claus e
is va lid “‘a s l on g a s it is clear, unambiguous a nd not in
contravention of public policy .’”31 Although not expressly
included in the Supreme Court’s analysis, the Court of Appeals ,
w hos e decisi on the S upreme Court a ffirmed, als o emphas ized
th a t “[a ]n am bigui ty wi ll not be cr ea ted wh er e none exi s ts .”32
In ligh t of the s e gene ra l pr inci ple s of contr a ct
interpretation, the court held that the language of the exclusion
clause was indeed “pla in .”33 The cour t noted tha t th e in s ur a nce
policy “does not qualify the in jur ie s exclu ded f rom cover a ge
with ter ms s uch a s ‘wr ongful ’ or ‘unjus ti fie d,’” but rather “only
distinguis hes inju ri es tha t a re e ith er ‘inten ded or expe cted’
from those that a re purely accidental.”34 The policy la nguage,
the cour t r ea soned, calls for a “subjective inquiry into the intent
or expectation of the in s ur ed,”35 and requires nothing more than
a finding that the “injuries a re the ‘natura l, fores eeable,
expe cted, and anticipated result of an intentional a ct.’”36 Thus,
where an ins ured “intend[s], or at lea st expect[s], that bodily

28. Id. at 842.
29. Id. at 841 (quoting A uto-Owne rs Ins . Co. v. Chur chm an , 489 N.W.2d 431
(Mich. 1992 )).
30. Id.
31. Id. (quoting Raska v. Fa rm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 314 N.W.2d 440 (Mich.
1982 )).
32. Auto-Owners Ins . Co. v. Harrington, 538 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995 ); s ee als o Church man, 489 N.W.2d a t 431.
33. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 842.
34. Id. (e mp ha s i s a dd ed ).
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting Metropolitan Propert y & Li ab. In s. Co. v . DiCicco, 443 N.W.2d
734, 743 (Mich. 1989)). The court als o noted that “‘[t]here is a significant difference
between insurance contracts that exclude both intentional and exp ected injuries and
t h os e tha t me re ly e xclu de in ten tiona l in jur ies .’” Id. at 842 n.6 (empha si s a dded)
(quoting Frank enmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Piccard, 489 N.W.2d 422 (Mich. 1992)
(plurality opinion)).
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injury [will] result from”37 an i ntentional a ct, the resulti ng
in jur ies fa ll “s qua re ly wi th in the in ten ti ona l-a ct ex clu s ion.”38
Applying these rules to the case, the court noted that the
v ol itional nature of Har rington’s a ct was not in
dis pu te —a lt hough he argued that the shooting wa s
“re a cti ona ry ,”39 Harr ington admitted that he “intentionally
pointed his gun at Tew and intended to shoot . . . hoping to stop
[him].”40 Addi tiona ll y, t he court noted that Harrington had
“retr ieved his . . . shotgun from his gara ge” earlier in the da y
with the expectation that he might need it to defend himself
from Tew.41 From the nature of the act the court concluded that
“Har rington certainly was awa re . . . ‘that intentionally
shooting at [Tew] would result in serious bodily harm or
dea th .’”42 Thus even if the shooting was, a s Harri ngton claimed,
a “justifiable res ponse to un w a r ranted aggression,” to except it
from the exclusion clause would “impermiss ibly disregard the
clea r l a ngua ge of the . . . contr a ct.”43
While the court recognized that other jurisdictions have
held “th a t a n i ns ur ed’s i nt en ti ona l a ct ta k en in s el f-defens e
does not consti tute intentional conduct,” it noted that it view ed
its holdi ng a s “consona nt wi th the ma jori ty [of th e] st a te[s ].”44 It
als o noted that its holding wa s cons is tent wi th th e r ea s onin g of
its “prior determina tions that injurious a ction by an in sur ed
who is ill or intoxicated, and subsequently absolved from civil

37. Id. at 842.
38. Id. at 840.
39. Id. at 842.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 840.
42. Id. a t 842 (quoting A uto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Har rin gton, 538 N.W.2d 106
(Mich. Ct. Ap p. 1995 )).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 842 (citing Tra ns am er ica Ins . Group v . Meer e, 694 P.2d 181 (Ari z.
1984 ); All st at e Ins . Co. v. Nova k, 313 N.W.2d 636 (Neb. 1981)). It is debatable
whether the Michigan rule tr uly repres ents a majority of courts that hav e decided
this is su e. But see St at e F ar m F ir e & Cas . Co. v. Ma rs ha ll, 554 S o. 2d 504, 505 (F l a .
1989) (“[T]he majority of j ur is di ct ion s . . . hol d t ha t s el f-d ef en s e i s not a n e xc ep ti on
to the int ent iona l a cts excl us ion . . . .”). S ee generally J a m es L. Rigel ha upt, J r.,
Annotation, Acts in S elf-Defense as Within Provis ion of Liability Insurance Policy
Expres sly Excluding Coverage for Damage or Injury Intended o r Expected by Insured,
34 A.L.R.4th 761 (1981 & Supp . 1996); Whita ke r, s upra note 1, a t 418 (stating that
“a mi nor it y of j ur is di ct ion s . . . ex cl ud e[] cov er a ge in s el f-d ef en se s it ua ti ons ”).
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or criminal liability, is nonetheless excluded from covera ge”
under such a policy provision.45
IV. A NAL Y S IS
At first blush, the Michigan court’s holding may give rise to
s ome fe el in gs of dis comfort. Tha t a n in s ur a nce company should
have no duty to defend a s ympathetic policy holder who has
simply attempted to protect himself or his fa mily from an
as sa ult ma y s eem to contra dict bas ic sentimental notions of
fair ness ; indee d, a good number of juris dictions ha ve decided
this iss ue to the contra ry. This Note argues, however, that the
Michigan court wa s correct for three rea sons.
Firs t, the court’s det er mi na ti on tha t i nju ri es ca us ed by
intentional a c ts t a k en in s elf-defen se a re “intende d or expe cted”
a n d therefore excluded from covera ge comports w ith tra ditional
principles of contr a ct interpret ati on. The language of these
policy exclusions is clear a nd unambiguous; 46 courts tha t find
tha t s uch an exclusion applies to acts tak en in self-defense
correctly apply the common meaning of these t erms . On the
other hand, jurisdictions which determine that covera ge exists
for such injuries s eem to ignore the rights of par ties to bargain
for contra ctual benefits and burdens and to rely on the
a greem ent’s clear la nguage. In short, requiring an insurer to
defend under such circumsta nces would amount to the judicial
revis ion of a clear contract.
S econd, while a n ins urer ’s duty t o defend may be broader
than its duty to indemnify, there can be no duty to defend
where there is no poss ibility that an injur y is covered under the
policy. In cases where the delibera te na ture of the act is not
dis pute d, regar dless of wheth er t he a ctions of the ins ur ed a re
justifi ed by self-defense principles, there simply is no poss ibility
that the res ulta nt injury may be covered. On one hand, if the
intentional act is not justified, it is s imply an intentional tort,
obviously outside the coverage of the policy.47 On the other
ha nd, if the a cts a re justifi ed, there is no liability and thus no
poss ibility for covera ge under the policy. With no possibility of

45. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 842 n.8.
46. For an ex ampl e of a typical exclusion clause, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
47. For a discuss ion of how an insurer’s duty to defend arises , see infra note
80 and accompanying text.
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cov er a ge r ega rdless of the outcome, there can be no duty to
defend or indemnify.
Finally, th e a rgu ment s a dva nce d by courts to justify judicial
tinkering wi th th e a bility of insurers and insur ed persons to
freely contra ct are unpersua sive. Such justifications ignore the
clear la ngua ge of thes e ex clus ion cla u s es and are simply a
reflection of preconceive d a nd unwise judicial policy “to
distribute the conse quen ces of [a ] los s on an ins ur a nce
company ” ra ther tha n on an i nsur ed in all cas es. 48
A. Trad itional Contract Analy s is
Courts rout in ely re cognize tha t in s ur a nce p olicy agreements
are contracts and that policy t e rms a re governed by traditional
rules of contra ct interpretation.49 Thus, policy terms are
as signed their “‘ordinary and popular’” defin iti ons a nd a re
given the mea ning “a la yper s on would ascribe to the
la ngua ge.”50 Alt hough m ost cour ts re cognize that “exclusionary
provi si ons a re n ot fav ored a nd . . . will be constr ued agains t the
in s ur er ,” this pres umption aris es only where the langua ge of
the excl us ion is “a mbiguous .”51 Where the language of such an

48. Tra ns am eri ca Ins . Group v. Mee re , 694 P.2d 181, 190 (Ariz. 1984) (Holohan,
C.J., dis se nti ng).
49. See, e.g., Harrington, 565 N.W.2d at 841 (“An insurance policy is an
agreement between parties that a court interprets ‘much the same a s any other
contract’ to best effe ctua te t he i nte nt of th e pa rt ies . . . .” (qu oting Auto-Owners Ins.
Co. v. Chu rch ma n, 489 N.W.2d 431, 433 (1992))). The Arizona Supreme Court
ostensibly ta kes a di ffer ent v iew of in su ra nce policy interpretation; the court notes
t ha t
[s]ome of the cases . . . resolve the is sue [of whether self defense falls
within the in te nd ed or ex pe ct ed in ju ry ex cl us ion ] on t he fi ct ion a l ba sis of
the “intent of the parties.” . . . This is an approach which we have
aba ndoned. . . . We be lieve the proper methodology is to determine the
meaning of the cl au se . . . by examinin g the pur pose of th e ex clus ion . . .
, the public policy considerations involved and the transa ction as a whole.
Meere , 694 P.2d a t 185 (cita tions omitt ed). How e v er , even the Arizona court admits
t ha t this approach is only valid wher e the policy ter m “is sus ceptible to different
const ru ctions .” Id.
50. Montr os e Che m. Corp . v. Adm ir a l In s. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 888 (Cal . 1995)
(quoting CAL . CIV . CODE §§ 1638, 1644); se e also Espinet v . Hor vat h, 597 A.2d 307,
309 (Vt. 1991); GEORGE J . COUCH E T A L., COUCH CY C L OP E D IA OF INSURA N C E L A W
§ 44:286 (2 d e d. 1 982).
51. North Ca r ol i na F a r m Bu r ea u Mu t . I ns . Co. v. S tox , 412 S.E.2d 318, 321
(N.C. 1992 ).
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exclusionary clause is “‘clear, unambiguous a nd not in
contr a ve nt ion of publ ic poli cy,’ ” the cl a us e wi ll be found v a lid. 52
Liability insura nce policies such as the one at iss ue in
Harring ton typically limit cover a ge to in jur ie s th a t a ri s e by
“a ccide nt .”53 In its ordinar y s ense, the word “accident” refers to
“a n event happening without any hum a n a gency ,”54 or a n
“unusual, unexpected, and unforeseen ha ppe ni ng.”55 Because
the language of these insura nce policies mak es clear tha t the
accidental natu re of the injury must be determined from the
point of view of the insu red (as opposed to the victim), the
Was hington Supr eme Court has held that, in accordance with
the common definition, “an a ccident is never present wh en a
de lib era te act is performed unless some additional unexpected,
independent a nd u nfor es een ha ppe ni ng occur s wh ich . . . brin gs
about the result . . . .”56
Policies such as the one at issue also typically exclude from
cov er a ge injuries tha t ar e “intended” from the sta ndpoint of the
ins ur ed.57 Although courts var y in their definition of what

52. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 841 (quotin g Ra sk a v . Fa rm Bur ea u Ins . Co., 314
N.W.2d 440 (M ic h. 1982 )).
53. S ee Gr a ng e I ns . Co. v . B ros s ea u, 776 P .2d 123, 124 (W a s h. 1989 ).
54. B LACK ’S L A W DICTIONARY 15 (6th ed. 1990). For an even more “ordinary”
definition, s ee W E B S T E R ’S NE W W ORLD DICTIONARY 4 (Pocket Books Pa per back ed.
1995) (defini ng “acciden t” as “an uni nte nded h ap peni ng . . . a mis ha p . . . chance”).
55. Grange Ins . Co ., 776 P.2d a t 125 (citing Ti eton v . Gene ra l Ins . Co. of Am.,
380 P. 2d 127 (W a s h. 1963 )).
56. Unigard Mut. Ins . Co. v. Spok an e S ch. Dis t. 8, 579 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Wash.
1978) (emphasis added). The reasoning of the Supreme Court of Washington in
Grange Insurance Co. v. Bros s eau, 776 P.2d 123 (Wash. 1989), is instructive. There,
the pl a in ti ff in s ur a nc e c omp a ny s ought a declara tion that it had no duty to defend
a n insured that intenti on a l ly s hot a third party in self-defense. The court first noted
t ha t the insurance policy in question, like the one at issue in Harrington, covered
injuries occurring by “accident,” but excluded injuries “expected or intended” by the
insured . Id. a t 124. In de te rmi ni ng th a t t he in ju rie s we re n ot “a cci de nt a l, ” the cou r t
employed a two-step analys is. Firs t, the court inquired whether the insured’s acts
giving ri se to the i nju ry wer e “deliber at e.” Id. at 125. Once the deliberate natu re of
the act was established, an injur y could only be conside red “accidenta l” if “‘som e
a d di ti on a l unexpected, independent an d unfore se en ha ppeni ng occurs whi ch
produces . . . inju ry or dea th.’ ” Id. (citin g Unigard, 579 P .2d a t 1018).
57. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 841; se e also North Carolina Fa rm Burea u Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Stox, 412 S.E.2d 318, 322 (N.C. 1994); Whita ke r, s upra note 1, a t 415.
Alt hough th e e ff ec ts of s uc h a n e xc lu s ion cl a us e a re of te n a na ly zed s ep a ra te ly fr om
the a na ly s is of t he in ju ry a s a n “a cci de nt ,” som e c our ts ha ve n oted that the two
issues a re, in rea li ty , two i nc a rna ti ons of t he s a me ques ti on. S ee Unigard, 579 P.2d
a t 1018.
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consti tutes an “intended” injury, 58 the term i s genera lly us ed in
a n insura nce context “to denote that the actor desires to caus e
the consequences of his a ct or believe[s] that some consequences
are s ubstantially certain to re s ul t fr om his a ct.”59 The la ngu a ge
of a typ ica l in tende d inju ry exclu si on clau se does not a dd an
additional requirement that th e a ct produ cin g th e inju ry a ls o be
“‘wr ongful’ or ‘unju st ifie d’” in order for the exclusion to apply. 60
Although some courts ha ve judicially i nferred such a
requirement,61 the F lorida S upreme Court has noted that,
bas ed solely on the pla in la nguage of the claus e,
[t]h e i n t en t u n de r ly i n g a n a c t of s e l f- de f e n s e w h e r e th e
d e f e n d er i n t e n ds t o h a r m t h e a tta cke r i s i d e n ti c a l to t h a t
u n d e r l y i n g an as sa ult. In each, the a ctor inten ds to inf l ict
h a r m on t he ot h er . J u s t a s a s s a u l t i s of te n i mpul si v e or
re a c t i v e, s o too i s s e l f -d e f en s e . Th e d i ff e r e n ce b e tw e e n t h e t w o
l i e s i n t h e m o t i v e or purpos e g ov e r n in g th e a ct . . . .
N e ve r th e le s s , su c h a c ts of se l f -de f e nse a re u n denia bly
i n t e n ti on a l an d ha ve been held to be embra ced wi thin
intentiona l act exclus ions by a ma jority of courts. 62

Even where the i nsur ed ar gues tha t he ha d no ill will or des ire
to hurt a n att ack er, but merely in tended to protect himself,

58. For a g en e ra l di s cu s s ion of how v a r iou s cou r ts d efine “intent to injure” in
a n ins ur an ce cover age contex t, s ee W hit ak er , s upra note 1, at 415–16. Whitaker
n ot e s:
Whether a court will f ind coverage . . . depends lar gely on the jurisdictional
interpretation of policy exclusions for injur ies cau se d int ent iona lly by . . .
the insured. The three primary interpreta tions ta ke n by court s a re : (1)
whether the i ns ure d inte nded to commit the a ct a nd intended it “to cause
some kind of bodily injury;” (2) whether the insured had the “specific intent
to cause the type of injury suffered;” or (3) whether the insure d intended
the “na tur al an d proba ble cons eque nces of the i ns ur ed’s a ct.”
Id. at 416 (footnote s omi tte d) (quoting P ac huk i v . Repu blic In s. Co., 278 N.W.2d 898,
901 (Wis . 1979)).
59. COUCH, supra note 50, § 44:289.
60. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 842.
61. See, f or exa mpl e, S tate Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Po omaih ealani, 667 F .
Supp. 705, 709 (D. Haw . 1987) (citing Tr a ns am er ica Ins . Group v. Mee re , 694 P.2d
181, 189 (Ariz. 1984), for the proposition that “‘t h e p r op er i nt e rp r et a t ion of th e cl a u s e
in question is that it excludes . . . covera ge when the insured intentionally a cts
w rongfully with a purpose to injure’”); Mullen v. Glens Fa lls Ins. Co., 140 Cal. Rptr.
605, 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (“[W]hen a . . . policy excludes . . . injuri e s . . . that are
either ‘intended’ or ‘excepted,’ [sic] the policy is construed merely to exclu de . . .
injuries . . . res ul ti ng fr om a ct s in volv in g a n e le me nt of wrongful n es s or
mis conduct . . . .”).
62. State Fa rm F ir e & Ca s . Co. v . Ma rs ha ll , 554 S o. 2d 504, 505 (F la . 1989).
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courts applying the common definition of “intended” have
recognized that the ins ured “must be taken to hav e int ended a n
injury where the cir cums ta nces ind ica te t ha t he kn ew h is a ct
woul d da ma ge th e in jur ed pa rt y.”63
F in a lly, policies su ch a s t he one a t is su e ty pica lly exclu de
from covera ge injuries which ar e “expected” from the
sta ndpoint of the in s ur ed. As t he Michigan Supreme Court
noted in Harrington, “[t]he policy ’s u se of the word ‘expected’
broadens the scope of the exclusion becaus e ‘expected’ injuries
are the ‘natura l, foreseea ble, expected, and anticipated result of
a n intentiona l a ct.’”64 J urisdictions a pplying the “plain,
ordinary, and popular s ense”65 of the word “expected” have
readily determined that “[t]hough [legally] justified, an injury
inflicted by an act taken in s elf-defense ma y be exp ecte d.”66 On
the other hand, jurisdictions tha t require that the insu red
demonstra te something ak in to specific intent to injure in order
for the injury to be excluded seem to simply ignore the
“expected” prong of the inquiry. 67
J urisdictions holding that a n act tak en in self-defense is not
“expe cted” because it is merely an unp la nned “reaction to [a n]
a tt a ck er ,”68 rely on faulty reas oning. Firs t, taking this
ar gument to its logical extr eme, all acts are “unexpected” before
they a re pla nned; that a n act ta ken in self-defense often entails

63. Espinet v. Horv at h, 597 A.2d 307, 309 (Vt. 1991); se e also Hartford Accident
& Indem . Co. v. Kr ek ele r, 363 F . Su pp. 354, 358 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (holding that where
a n insur ed intended the movemen t of his own a rm , the clenching of his own fist, and
the forceful contact between his fist an d another person, a finding that the injuries
were “intended” was “ines c ap a ble”), rev’d on other grounds , 491 F.2d 884 (8th Cir.
1974 ).
64. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 842.
65. Esp inet, 597 A.2d at 309 (quoting S ta te v . Glen s F al ls Ins . Co., 404 A.2d 101
(Vt. 1979 ).
66. Id. at 310.
67. See, e.g., Nort h Ca roli na Fa rm Bu re au Mut. Ins . Co. v. S tox, 412 S .E.2d 318
(N.C. 1992). Des pite the pre se nce of th e word “expe cted” in th e ex clus ion cla us e, this
c a s e rejects an appella t e cou r t’s opinion that an injury fits under the exclusion clause
even though “‘there might well have been no specific intent to injur e,’ ” an d holds
t ha t “the resulting injury, not merely the volitional a ct, . . . must be intend ed for ”
the “expe cted or i nte nded” exclu si on to app ly. Id. at 322 (quoting North Carolina
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stox., 401 S.E.2d 82, 85 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). Even the
North Carolina Supreme Court recognized, however, that “[t]he chara cter of the
ins ure d’s a c t [could] ris e to the l eve l wh ich woul d requ ire tha t a n int enti on to infli ct
a n inj ur y be i nfer re d.” Id. at 324.
68. Preferred Mut. In s . Co. v . Th omp s on, 491 N .E .2d 688, 691 (Oh io 1986).
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only a s hort planning period should n ot change the analys is.
S e cond, because the la nguage of these exclus ion clau ses refers
to expe cted “injuries ” ra ther than “acts,” the focus of ana lysis
should be on w h et h er , given the volitional char acter of the act,
the ins ur ed expe cted the res ult. The question is not whether the
ins u r e d “expected” to shoot an a ttacker when he left his home
in the morning; the question is, ra ther, given the fact that the
a ct of shooting was deliberate, whether the ins ured “expe cted”
the resultant injury.69
Thus, in light of the “plain, ordinary, and popular”
definitions of the policy terms, an injury simply cannot be
“accidental” where, as in Harring ton , an insur ed admits that he
deliberately “pointed his gun at [a victim] and intended to shoot
him, hopin g to st op [hi s ] adv a nce.”70 Simila rly, given the
deliberate cha ra cter of the defensive shooting, a finding that
the resulta nt injury is not expected or intended in the ordinar y
sens e of thos e te rm s woul d, in t he words of the Mich iga n
Supr eme Court, “‘fl[y] in the face of all rea son, common sens e
a n d exp er ien ce.’”71 Because th e la ngu a ge of the policy mentions
nothing about a “wrongfulness” qualification in order for the
exclusion clause to apply, the fact that a n insured is motiva t ed
to a ct out of a perceived need to defend himself “in no way
negates the deliberate na ture of his a ct.”72 The language of the
exclusion clause at is sue in Harrington simply states “we do not
cover . . . bodily in jur y . . . expected or intended by an ins ured
person”;73 thus , the Mich iga n Supreme Court wa s correct in its
determination that, according to the “plain la nguage of the
policy ,”74 there wa s no cover age for injuries caus ed by the
insu red’s int entional a ct tak en in s elf-defense.
Because these “expected or intended injur y” claus es a re
unambiguous, court s s hould not “re wr it e [the ] poli cy . . . to
provi de covera ge where the clear lan guage . . . does not.”75 As

69. S ee Grange Ins. Co. v. Brosseau , 776 P.2d 123, 126 (Was h. 1989)
(recognizing that “[s]erious bodily injury, . . . was, from [the insured’s] standpoint,
obviously a n e xp ec te d r es ul t of hi s in te nt ion a l a ct of s hoot in g [th e a tt a ck er ]”).
70. Auto-Owners In s . Co. v . Ha rrin gton, 565 N .W .2d 839, 842 (M ic h. 1997 ).
71. Id. (quoting Metropolitan Proper ty & Lia b. Ins . Co. v. DiCicco, 443 N.W.2d
734, 746 (M ic h. 1989 )).
72. Grange Ins . Co ., 776 P.2d a t 126.
73. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 841.
74. Id. at 842.
75. State Fa rm Fi re & Cas . Co. v. Ma rs ha ll, 554 S o. 2d 504, 506 (F la . 1989);
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the Supreme Court of Florida has noted, “the sa nctity of the
pa rt ies to fre ely contra ct pr ev a il s ,” ev en in a cover a ge exclusion
context.76 Becaus e the right to freely contra ct and rely on the
plain meaning of the terms in a n agreement is s o vita l, even if a
court could identify a valid public policy reas on favoring
covera ge, courts s hould be reluctant to “invoke such public
policy to overr ide the provisions of these policies .”77 As a
dissenting justice in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Berray 78 noted,
s uch disr espect for part ies’ ability to contra ct could be applied
to undermine any “attempt[] by [an] insur er to use si mple,
under s ta nda ble l a ngua ge in the poli cy e xcl us ion.”79
B . No Poss ibility of Coverage
It is generally accepted that a n insurer ’s duty to defend
mus t be determ in ed ba s ed on w heth er a cla im a ga inst a n
insu red person gives ris e to a “potential of liability.”80 This
potential in turn must be evalua ted in light of the “allegations
of the complaint” against th e insured, as well as a ny “[f ]acts
extrinsic to the compl a in t . . . [wh ich ] rev ea l a poss ibi lity that
the claim may be covered by the policy.”81 Thus, where facts
suggest that the insured’s conduct may hav e been merely
negligent, the insurer r etains a duty to defend even though the

s e e also Grange Ins. Co., 776 P.2d at 127 (“We . . . will not rewrite the policy her e
to provide for coverage when the plain language of the policy does not.”); Home Ins.
Co. v. Ne ils en, 332 N.E .2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. Ap p. 1975) (refusing to “rewrit[e] the
contra ct agreed to by the parties to provide any additional covera ge”); Espinet v.
Horva th, 597 A.2d 307, 310 (Vt. 1991) (“We may not read [a wrongfulnes s ]
requirement in to t he con tr a ct .”).
76. Marsh all, 554 So. 2d a t 505.
77. Grange Ins. Co., 776 P.2d a t 127.
78. 694 P. 2d 191 (A riz . 1984).
79. Id. a t 195 (Hol oha n, C.J ., d is sen ti ng ).
80. G ra y v. Zur ich I ns . Co., 419 P.2d 168, 177 (Cal. 1966). It is often said that
a n insurer’s “duty to defend is broader than t he duty to indemnify.” Horace Mann
Ins. Co. v. Ba rba ra B., 846 P.2d 792, 795 (Cal. 1993). This principle has been
articula ted to ensure that a n insured will be protected ev en w her e a su it m ay be
“groundless, fa ls e or fr au dule nt.” All st at e Ins . Co. v. Nova k, 313 N.W .2d 636, 638
(Neb. 1981). This oft-quoted language, however, does not suggest t ha t a n i ns u r er h a s
a n absolute duty to defend even where there is no possibility that the injury could
be covered under the terms of the policy; rather, the duty ar ises only “where
facts . . . alleged . . . if proven, would render the insu re r l ia ble.” Grange Ins . Co., 776
P.2d at 124.
81. Barbara B ., 846 P.2d a t 795.
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complaint ma y only allege intentional torts. 82 However, as the
Supr eme Court of Michiga n has pointed out, no duty to defend
ca n be manufactured where the contention tha t the ins ured
“did not intend or expect the injury ‘flies in the face of all
re a s on, common s ens e a nd e xpe ri ence .’”83
In cases such a s the one under considera tion in Harrington,
where there is “no serious question”84 regarding the deliberate
chara cter of the insured’s a ct a nd the expected or intended
nature of the resultant injury, there is simply no “poss ibility
that the claim may be covere d by th e poli cy.”85 Firs t, looking
solely to the “allegations of the compla in t,”86 the pla intiff ’s
“wrongful death a ction”87 a ll eged in tent iona l t orts a ga in s t t he
insu red. Second, even if the allegations of complaint included a
cla i m that Harr ington negligently discharged his shotgun a t
Tew, the “[f ]acts extrinsic to the complaint”88 brought to light
during discovery, particularly Ha rrington’s a dmission during
deposition testimony that he deliberately retrieved his s hotgun
a n d in tent iona ll y s hot Tew wi th th e pu rp ose of st oppin g him,89
independently showed that Tew’s injur ies w ere “in ten ti ona l, or
a t least expected”90 and therefore outside the poss ible realm of
cov er a ge under the “expected or intende d” excl us ion cla us e. A
finding that Harrington’s a ct could have been merely negligent
under thes e cir cums ta nces indee d “‘flies in the face of all
reas on, common sense a nd experience.’”91 Thus, under
prev ailing notions of insurance covera ge law, there can be no

82. S ee Zelda Inc. v . North la nd In s. Co., 66 Ca l. Rpt r. 2d 356, 361 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997) (ci ti ng Montr os e Ch em . Cor p. v. S up er ior Cour t, 861 P .2d 1153 (Ca l. 1993 ))
(recognizing that to determine a duty to defend, an insurer must take into account
all av ai la ble fa cts ).
83. Auto Club Gr oup Ins . Co. v. Ma rzoni e, 527 N.W.2d 760, 768 (Mich . 1994)
(plurality opinion) (quoting Metropolitan Pr opert y & Li ab. In s. Co. v . DiCicco, 443
N.W.2d 734, 746 (Mich. 1989)); se e also Gunderson v. Fire Ins. Exch., 44 Cal. Rptr.
2d 272, 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“An insured may not trigger the duty to defe nd by
speculating a bout e xt ra ne ous ‘fa ct s ’ re ga rdi ng pot en ti a l l ia bili ty .”).
84. Grange Ins . Co ., 776 P.2d a t 127.
85. Barbara B ., 846 P.2d a t 795.
86. Id.
87. Auto-Owners In s . Co. v . Ha rrin gton, 565 N .W .2d 839, 840 (M ic h. 1997 ).
88. Barbara B ., 846 P.2d a t 795.
89. S ee supra note 20.
90. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d a t 842.
91. Id. (quoting Me tr opolita n P roper ty & Lia b. Ins . Co. v. DiCicco, 443 N.W.2d
734, 746 (Mich. 1989)).

D:\ 1998-4\ FI NAL \ BA I-FIN .WP D

1645]

REWRITING E XCLUS ION CLAUS ES

J an . 8, 2001

1659

duty to defend where an ins ured’s a ct is clearly int entiona l,
rega rdl es s of wh ethe r i t is jus tifi ed.
Articula ted in another way, there is no practical possibility,
ba s e d on the nature of the victim’s claim a nd the insured’s
proffer of se lf-de fen s e, “tha t the claim may be covered by the
policy ,”92 regardless of whether Har rington’s actions were
legally justifi ed by self-defense principles . On one hand, if the
t ri a l court were to find that Harrington’s us e of force was not
justifiable s elf-defe ns e, his a dmi tt edl y i nt enti ona l a ct w ould be
a n intentiona l tor t, cle a rl y outs ide t he cove ra ge of the p olicy. 93
On the other hand, if the trial court were to find that
Har rington’s use of force was indeed reas onable self-defense, he
would not be liable to Tew; the insurer w ould thus hav e no
r ea s on to indemnify the claim. Therefore, based on the
generally a ccepted s ta nda rd t hat a n insurer only has a duty to
defend where the damages sought are potentially within the
coverage of the policy,94 an i nsur er h a s no duty to defend where
the liability of a n insured depends on whether an admittedly
intentional a ct either is , or is not, self-defense.
C. Th e Reas oning of Cas es to th e Contrar y is Unpe rs uas ive
Courts holding that injuries caused by the deliberate acts of
a n insured in self-defense are covered by liability insu ra nce
policies, despite the pr esence of an “expected or intended
injury” exclusion clause, have a r ticul a ted s ev er a l poli cy
considera tions to justify their failure to give effect to the plain
la ngu a ge of these policy terms . None of these p olicy arguments
is per sua siv e.
In Trans americ a Insuranc e Gro up v . Meere ,95 the Arizona
Supr eme Court held t ha t i nju ri es re s ul ti ng f r om actions ta ken
by a n in su red i n s elf-defense wer e indeed covered under a

92. Barbara B ., 846 P.2d a t 795.
93. S ee W ILLIAM L. P R O S S E R, HAND BOOK OF T HE L A W OF TORTS § 19, at 109–10
(4th ed . 1971) (“The defendant is not privileged to inflict a beating which goes beyond
the re al or a ppa re nt n eces si tie s of hi s own defen se . If he does, h e is commit tin g a
t or t a s t o the ex ces si ve f orce . . . .”). But cf. Tra ns am er ica Ins . Group v. Mee re , 694
P.2d 181, 187 (Ariz. 1984) (opining that some courts “fix m ini ma l bl ame on one who
ov e rr e a ct s in s elf-de fens e beca us e . . . the men ta l s ta te i nduce d in one re puls ing a n
at ta ck is di ff er en t f rom t ha t of th e a tt a ck er (wh o com mi ts a n ‘i nt en ti ona l t ort’)”).
94. S ee Gr a y v. Zur ic h I ns . Co., 419 P .2d 168, 177 (Ca l. 1966 ).
95. 694 P. 2d 181 (A riz . 1984).
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liability policy, despite the pr esence of a n “expe cted or
int ended” exclusion claus e.96 The cour t r ea s oned t ha t a lt hough
the self-defensive act of an insured may be undeniably
volitional, her “primar y intent” is to p r otect herself, not to
injure her as sa ilant. 97 The court therefore held that, in an
“expected or inten ded injury” exclusion context, “the relevant
intent” is “the purpose which underlies th e insured’s bas ic
conduct ,” ra ther than the intent “tha t . . . accompanies the
immediate a ct.”98 Thus an injury caus ed by the volitional a ct of
a n insured is only excluded from coverage if “the conduct which
led to the [injury] was intentionally wrongful from the
vi ew point of the la w of tor ts .”99
The Arizona S upreme Court expanded upon this “primary
intent” theme in Fire Ins urance E xch ange v . Be rray .100 Here,
the court explicitly recognized tha t in most intentional tort
contexts, “intent” requires little more th a n t ha t t he a ct be
volitional. 101 The cour t fu rt her noted t ha t, in wh a t it ca lled “a
narrow sens e,” “the act of shooting a person in self-defense is
intentional.”102 Despite this recognition of the ordinary
definition of intent, the court a dopted a “broader ”103 definition
of the word, holding that “in order to constitute ‘intent’ in a n
intentional a cts exclu si on . . . the i ns ur ed mus t des ire to h arm
th e p laintiff.”104

96. S ee id. at 184.
97. Id. at 188; s ee als o, e.g. , All st at e Ins . Co. v. Nova k, 313 N.W .2d 636, 640–41
(Neb. 1981) (“[W]hen one acts in self-defense the actor is not generally a cting for the
p ur p os e of intending any injury to another but, rather, is acting for the purpose of
attempting to prevent injury to himself.”); Farmer s Ins. Exch. v. S ippl e, 255 N.W.2d
373, 376–77 (Minn. 1977) (finding cover age w her e ins ure d’s act of str i k in g a n
ass ailant in s el f-d ef en s e w a s “jus t a ref le x a ct ion ”).
98. Meere, 694 P.2d a t 186.
99. Id. at 189; s ee al s o Fire Ins. Exch. v. Altieri, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 364 (Cal.
Ct. Ap p. 1992 ) (rec ogniz in g tha t Ca li for ni a cou rts in fe r a n “el em en t of wrongfuln e s s”
in a coverage exclusion).
100. 694 P. 2d 191 (A riz . 1984).
101. S ee id. at 194 (citing W. P R O S S E R, TH E L A W OF TORTS § 8 at 31 (3d ed.
1964 )).
102. Id. at 193 (emphasis added) (quoting Fi re Ins . Ex ch. v . Ber ra y, 694 P .2d
259, 261 (Ariz. Ct. Ap p. 1983), mod ified, 694 P .2d 191 (A riz. 1984)).
103. Berray , 694 P.2d a t 193 (quotin g Fi re Ins . Ex cha nge v . Ber ra y, 694 P .2d
259, 261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)). In contrast, the California Suprem e Court r ecognized
a “common and ordinary ” definition of “intent.” Montrose Chem. Corp. v. A dm i ra l In s .
Co., 913 P.2d 878, 888 (Cal . 1995).
104. Id. at 194 (empha si s a dded) (quoting Pa tr on-Oxford Mut. Ins . Co. v. Dodge,
426 A.2d 888, 891– 92 (Me . 1981)).
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This reas oning utterly fails to take into considera tion the
la ngu a ge of “expected or intended injury ” exclusion claus es. The
fa ct that an insured may prefer not to have ever been involved
in a s ituat ion where self-defense becomes necessa ry does not
m a k e her a ctions a ny les s “intentional” or the r esult ing injuries
a n y less “expected.” The language of these exclusion claus e s
simply “does not qualify the injuries excluded from cove ra ge
with ter ms s uch a s ‘wr ongful ’ or ‘unjus ti fie d.’”105 Additionally,
a s has been previously discussed, such reas oning also fails to
re cognize that the use of the word “expected” in the exclusion
clause “broa dens th e s cope of the excl us ion.”106 Even if the
reas oning of the Arizona court could validly be applied to
determine whether injuries caus ed by an i n s ur ed were
“in ten ti ona l,” it cannot be sa id that an ins ured who acts
intentionally with force sufficient t o defend h er s elf fr om at ta ck
does not “expect” her action to cause some injury. The inclusion
of the word “expected” in the language of the clause ma nifests a
clear intent on the part of the dra fters of the contra ct that
exclusion of injuries not be determined bas ed solely on the
wrongfulness of the acts which caus ed them.
Other courts holding that a ctions t a k en in se lf-defen se do
not fall under such an exclusion clause rea son that “the
ra ti ona le f or . . . inten ti ona l i nju ry excl us ion [cla us es ] . . . [is to]
‘prevent[] individuals from pur cha s ing i ns ur a nce as a s hield for
their anticip ated intentional misconduct’” th us a ll owin g a n
ins ur a nce company to accurately calculate its risk of liability.107
Therefore, becaus e “[a]n act of self-defense . . . is neither
ant icipated nor w rongfu l,”108 the r ationale does not apply, and
cov er a ge s hould be found . Thes e cour ts ignor e, however, that
the lan guage of these policies mentions nothing about whether
a n injury is “ant icipa ted” or “wrongful.” Further, this
ar gument’s “conclusion . . . does not follow from the premi se”;109
a s the Supreme Court of Was hington has noted, the fact that
the “law actually prohibits the purchase of insurance covering

105. Auto-Owners In s . Co. v . Ha rrin gton, 565 N .W .2d 839, 842 (M ic h. 1997 ).
106. Id.
107. State Fa rm Fi re & Cas . Co. v. Pooma ihe al an i, 667 F. S up p. 7 05, 7 09 (D.
Haw. 1987) (quoting P re fer re d Mut. Ins . Co. v. Thomps on, 491 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ohio
1986 )).
108. Thompson, 491 N.E.2d a t 691.
109. Chis om v. Roe me r, 501 U.S . 380, 403 (19 91).
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[wrongful] a cts” does not necessa rily mean that “acts of selfdefense which are la wful are ther efore covered. That which
public policy prohibits does not determ in e tha t w hi ch m us t be
consi der ed cove re d.”110
Still another a rgument ha s been a dvanced that, even if the
la ngu a ge of “expected or intended injury” exclusion clauses is
indeed clear a nd unambiguous, consu mers in the ma rk et for
liability in s ur a nce ha ve li tt le opport un it y t o bar ga i n for the
omiss ion of such a claus e. This a rgument ignores the fact that
insurers offer liability policies which do not contain the
standard “expected or intended injury” clause. In Cochran v.
Aetna Cas ualty & S urety Co.,111 for example, the Maryla nd
Court of Appeals dealt with an “expected or intended” exclusion
clause tha t explicitl y did not apply t o injuries “resulting from
the use of reas onable force to protect pe rs ons or pr opert y.”112
Thus, although a consumer ma y not be able to bargain for the
deletion or a ddition of terms in a ny given policy, she does hav e
the option to “shop around” for the ty pe of liability covera ge for
which she is willing to pay.
V. CONCLU S ION
Courts addressing the issue of whether injuries resultin g
from an intentional act tak en in self-defense a re covered under
a sta ndard “expected or intended injury” exclusion clause
should restr ain thems elves from yielding to the temptation of
rewriting insura nce policies to accomplish res ults which,
although sentimentally more appea ling, are not justified by the
policies’ clea r t er ms . “Free dom of contra ct” reas oning is sound
a n d courts s hould enforce the plain langua ge of these ty pes of
contra cts. The l a ngu a ge of such exclusion clauses clearly
manifes ts the par ties ’ intent to exempt such results from
covera ge. Therefore, insura nce companies must ha ve the right
to bargain for and rely on favorable terms in liability policies
which they is sue.
D. Heath Bailey

110. Gra nge Ins. Co. v. Brosseau , 776 P.2d 123, 126 (Was h. 1989).
111. 637 A.2d 509 (Md. Ct. Spec. A pp. 1994), aff ’d, 651 A.2d 859 (M d. 1 995).
112. Id. at 510; cf. Zelda In c. v. Northla nd In s. Co., 66 Ca l. Rpt r. 2d 356, 361
(Cal . Ct. App. 1997) (interpreting a policy excluding from covera ge injuries “aris ing
out of a s sault or battery, or out of any act or omission in connection with the
prevention or suppression of an assault or battery”).

